THE ALASKA WATCHMEN GROUP
RISK ANALYSIS & MITIGATION SUMMARY
The Soviet Threat To Alaska
SYNOPSIS:
Given the historical and existing current assumptions, as well as strategies involving the Soviet's Cold War era aspiration of Alaska; to wit, it's abundant natural resources, as well as Alaska's strategic location within the northern hemisphere; a thorough analysis of this prevalent threat is therefore required in order to arrive within a the framework of a predicated response which mitigates the omnipresent threat thereof.
Assumption #1:
Current global situations across the theater provide both a realistic, as well as favorable environment for an unprecedented incursion by the Soviet military apparatus into mainland Alaska territories.
The Russian geopolitical and economic situation(s) have reached a critical stage. Widespread dissatisfaction of Vladimir Putin's domestic and foreign polices has given rise to street level protests, some of which have turned deadly.
The primary hub of the Soviet Politburo has always been focused upon their maintaining the status quo within their organizational composition. Dissatisfaction has been historically dealt with at the extreme levels, or by carefully orchestrated deflection of the domestic issues through foreign interventionism; as was the case in the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
Assumption #2:
America and its NATO allies, as well as coalition partners, are presently involved within the scope of several multilevel regional conflict(s) which are quickly and disproportionately draining America's strategic reserves, both in the terms of resources and manpower, as well as public opinion.
Assumption #3:
Japan has recently fulfilled a multi-level commerce agreement with its arch-enemy The People's Republic of China. A deal that is viewed by the west as unprecedented, and gives potential for what many believed are a shift in the balance of power among Pan-Asian countries.
Japan is wholly reliant upon America and NATO for its defense, notwithstanding the empire's self-defense forces which are wholly inadequate in dealing with anything more than a local insurrection, or short-term conflicts within its own domicile.
Assumption #4:
The People's Republic of China has repeatedly warned America and NATO allies that interference with its domestic polices regarding Taiwan would harbor consequences. This is evidenced by the increasingly hostile attitude within the military stratocracy, and its aspiration for dominance within the Pan-Asian region; an area that China claims as sovereign territory--including Japan, the Philippines, Thailand, and other Pacific island within the circle of influence.
China's rapid military build-up, and the rearmament of the military services has grown exponentially over the last decade. Its current stockpile of short-range, and medium range missile, as well as its blue water naval capabilities, and strategic air assets; indicate a quiet reaffirmation of its foreign adventurism polices within the region.
Nuclear capabilities, as well as long-range delivery methods have likewise increased, as well as stealth fighter capabilities.
Assumption #5:
North Koreas continual tirade against its neighbors to the south, and threats of global nuclear conflicts have risen sharply since the demise of its former leader. North Korea's military governance has become increasingly hostile toward outsiders.
The primary supplier of weapons, armaments, and munitions to the North Korean military remains unchanged--China and Russia.
Assumption #6:
Given the volatile nature, as well as unpredictable tendencies of global economies, and the increasing shift in Asian attitudes towards the west; it should not surprise America and NATO when The People's Republic of China asserts its power against Taiwan through military force.
Intervention by America would create an immediate regional threat which has the capability to migrate into a global event. China's avowed partners include the Soviet Union, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and other Asian states.
American intercession would open the doors for other state players to enter the dispute; thereby creating opportunistic scenarios for the Soviet Union to fulfill its longstanding initiatives for the reacquisition of its former Alaskan territories.
Strategic Outlook:
Alaska is entirely dependent upon rail, maritime, roadway, and air transport of critical consumer, as well as defense inventories. Any minor disruption of these critical transportation system could create severe consequences for Alaska residents, as well as its military presence.
Within the scope of Alaska's territorial boundaries, certain geographic elements preclude rapid evacuation from affected areas. The ocean and mountainous barriers, as well as weather patterns create unfavorable conditions for a in-depth defensive stratagems. Given the technological advances, and weapons capability of the opponents, the Alaska military presence could offer but token resistance; much akin to the American strategic withdrawal into Seoul during the Korean conflict.
Alaska has little or no naval capability, and limited air capabilities. Given the Soviet invasion doctrine, the rapid development and employment of surface-to-air measures would greatly affect Alaska's air assets. The introduction of the SU-3000 missile system, as well as other delivery systems, likewise preclude air interdiction operations from within Canadian resources.
Soviet doctrines indicate a massed envelopment of the key facilities such as airfields, naval ports, commerce centers, as well as road junctures. Paratroop regiments and Spetnaz (Special Forces) could conceivably limit or restrict movement into or around denied areas; thereby creating static denial areas which preclude rapid facilitation of movement throughout the area; thereby limiting Alaskan mobility and/or tactical response(s).
Soviet naval transport forces, as well as air transportation capability would likely be utilized throughout Alaska, in an effort to secure key facilities. Within hours, the Soviets could transport several combat divisions into the areas already under their control.
It is theoretical that within three days, given the limited response capability within Alaska's military forces, that the Soviet Union could predictably occupy much of Alaska's cities, and other key strategic areas. It is without doubt that a "Denial of Opportunity" strategies employed by the Soviet forces could prevent rapid facilitation of reinforcements through Canada, or by sea lanes.
The proximity of Alaska to the Soviet Union, provides adequate defense in depth capabilities, as well as movement of critical supplies and additional follow-up forces.
Risk Mitigation & Response Strategies:
Understanding the geographical nature of Alaska, and its dependence upon outside resources, the military forces stationed within Alaska would be fighting on an asymmetrical forum. The defense would almost have to consists of delaying actions until reinforcements from other commands could arrive.
Given the current limited heavy armor, mechanized, and artillery disposition within the state's military organizational structures; it would be reasonable to assume an immediate, and potentially fatal assailment by Soviet military forces against these particular units.
Perhaps; in less than 72-hours the military presence in Alaska could be reduced to token levels of military resistance, if not a total capitulation of its forces into Soviet hands, as was the case during the Second World War Corregidor battles, whereby 30,000 combat troops surrendered to the Japanese forces due to lack of critical resources and reinforcement capabilities within the theater.
Key Response Strategies:
1. How would the Alaska State Guard be implemented in order to support Alaska's military forces?
2. Could a rapid draft of civilian citizens be mandated that would allow a swift integration into the overall defense of vital cities and/or population centers?
3. Are there sufficient military munitions inventories stockpiled in order to sustain multi-level protracted defensive actions?
4. Is it possible for Alaska to garrison adequate surface naval forces, as well as submarine capabilities to offset "denial of area" strategies utilized by a Soviet invasion?
5. What programs are currently active to protect vital government facilities, as well as civilian population centers?
6. Does Alaska maintain sufficient medical facilities, triage centers, and first echelon treatment capability to handle casualty rates of this nature?
ALASKA WATCHMEN GROUP
ADDENDUM TO RISK ANALYSIS & MITIGATION SUMMARY
Soviet Military Forces Disposition:
The Soviet military forces responsible for defense of the eastern region of the Soviet Union falls upon the Far Eastern Military District; a Red Banner Group commanded by Colonel-General O.L. Salyukov who assumed command in 2009.
The Far Eastern Military Districts is comprised of the following units:
14th Separate Brigade of Special Designation (Spetsnaz)
The 5th Army
The 35th Army,
HQ 68th Corps
Four Motor Rifle Divisions,
Four Machine-Gun/Artillery Divisions
83rd Airborne Brigade (With an incorporated light tank battalion)
635/654 and/or 954/598 Separate Airborne Battalions
Guards artillery battalion, and support units.
Ten units in the DVVO are now manned by contract servicemen.
Naval Forces Disposition:
Eastern Military District - Eastern Joint Strategic Command Pacific Fleet:
(1) Slava class cruiser
(1) Sovremennyy class destroyer
(4) Udaloy class destroyer
(3) Delta III class submarine
)2) Oscar class submarine
(5) Akula class submarine
(7) Kilo class submarine
The Pacific Fleet also includes coastal combatants such as corvettes and patrol ships, mine warfare vessels, support and logistic ships and light amphibious ships.
Naval Infantry:
9 motor-rifle brigades
1 tank brigade
1 Russian Airborne Troops brigade
1 Naval Infantry Brigade
7 bases for storage of weapons and equipment
Historical precedents accomplished by the Far Eastern Military District:
On August 20 Georgy Zhukov opened a major offensive with heavy air attack and three hours of artillery bombardment, after which three infantry divisions and five armoured brigades, supported by a fighter regiment and masses of artillery (57 thousand troops in total), stormed the 75,000 Japanese force deeply entrenched in the area. On August 23 the entire Japanese force found itself encircled, and on August 31 largely destroyed. Artillery and air attacks wiped out those Japanese who refused to surrender. Japan requested a cease-fire, and the conflict concluded with an agreement between the USSR, Mongolia and Japan signed on September 15 in Moscow. In the conflict, the Red Army losses were 9,703 killed in action (KIA) and missing in action (MIA) and 15,952 wounded. The Japanese lost 25,000 KIA; the grand total was 61,000 killed, missing, wounded and taken prisoner.
Shortly after the cease-fire, the Japanese negotiated access to the battlefields to collect their dead. Finding thousands upon thousands of dead bodies came as a further shock to the already shaken morale of the Japanese soldiers. The scale of the defeat probably became a major factor in discouraging a Japanese attack on the USSR during World War II, which allowed the Red Army to switch a large number of its Far Eastern troops into the European Theatre in the desperate autumn of 1941.
Summary of military units currently operating within the Far Eastern Military District:
Order of the Red Star Far Eastern Military District 2010:
Combat formations:
5th Army, in Ussuriysk
57th Guards Independent Motor-Rifle Brigade "Krasnodar"
59th Independent Motor-Rifle Brigade, in Sergeyevka equipped with BMP
60th Independent Motor-Rifle Brigade, in Kamen-Rybolov equipped with BMP
70th Guards Independent Motor-Rifle Brigade "Dukhovshchino-Khinganskaya", in Barabash equipped with MT-LBV
237th Reserve Base (89th Independent Motor-Rifle Brigade), in Bikin
245th Reserve Base (93rd Independent Motor-Rifle Brigade), in Lesozavodsk
247th Reserve Base (94th Independent Motor-Rifle Brigade), in Sibirtsevo
35th Army, in Belogorsk
38th Guards Independent Motor-Rifle Brigade, in Yekaterinoslavka equipped with BMP
64th Independent Motor-Rifle Brigade, in Khabarovsk equipped with BMP
69th Independent Brigade "Svir-Pomerania", in Babstovo
240th Reserve Base (90th Independent Motor-Rifle Brigade), in Belogorsk
243rd Reserve Base (92nd Independent Motor-Rifle Brigade), in Khabarovsk
261st Reserve Base (95th Independent Motor-Rifle Brigade), in Mokhovaya Pad
18th Machine Gun-Artillery Division, in Goryachie Klyuchi
46th Machine Gun-Artillery Regiment
49th Machine Gun-Artillery Regiment
14th Independent Spetsnaz Brigade, in Ussuriysk
39th Independent Motor-Rifle Brigade, in Khomutovo equipped with MT-LBV
83rd Independent Airborne Brigade, in Ussuriysk
230th Reserve Base (88th Independent Motor-Rifle Brigade), in Dachnoye
392nd District Training Center, in Knyaze-Volkonskoye
Missile and Artillery formations:
20th Guards Missile Brigade "Berlin", in Spassk-Dalny
107th Missile Brigade "Mozir", in Birobidzhan
165th Artillery Brigade "Prague", in Nikolskoye
305th Artillery Brigade, in Ussuriysk
338th Guards MLRS Brigade "Nevsko-Dvinskaya", Novosisoyevka
7020th Artillery Reserve Base "Kharbin", in Ussuriysk
7021st Artillery Reserve Base, in Nikolskoye
Air-Defense formations:
5th Army
8th Air-Defense Missile Brigade "Shavlinskaya" equipped with the Buk missile system
641st Air-Defense Command Center
35th Army
71st Air-Defense Missile Brigade equipped with the Buk missile system
643rd Air-Defense Command Center
Radar formations:
76th Independent Radio Technical Brigade, in Vyatskoye
94th Independent Radio Technical Battalion, in Ussuriysk (5th Army)
1889th Independent Radio Technical Battalion, in Belogorsk (35th Army)
Engineering formations:
37th Engineer Regiment (35th Army)
58th Engineer Regiment (5th Army)
2463rd Independent Engineer Battalion, in Ussuriysk
7027th Engineer Reserve Base
NBC-Defense formations:
16th Independent NBC-Defense Brigade, in Galkino
70th Independent Flamethrower Battalion, in Razdolnoye
122nd Independent NBC-Defense Battalion, in Ussuriysk (5th Army)
135th Independent NBC-Defense Battalion, in Khabarovsk (35th Army)
Signal formations:
17th Independent Electronic Warfare Brigade
104th (Communications Hub) Signal Brigade "Kluzh", in Khabarovsk
106th (Territorial) Signal Brigade
54th Signal Regiment (35th Army)
86th Signal Regiment (5th Army)
156th Independent (Rear) Signal Battalion
Conclusions:
[ The aforementioned assumptions are derived from my own research; and the following conclusions are likewise derived from my own research. The reader is advised to do his/her own research in order to arrive at their own conclusions. Franke Schein - March 30th 2012 - Anchorage, Alaska)
A quick analysis of the distance separating Alaska from the Russian Peninsula indicates that a mere 65(+/-) miles separates the two countries. 65-Nautical miles is nothing when considering the speed at which modern military formations are capable of producing.
Throughout the context of this document, it is clearly evident that the Far Eastern Military District is comprised of several Army Groups with attached support apparatus, as well as naval forces, and special forces units. The rapid deployment of these units, and their inherent cross-country capability is without doubt substantial in itself.
Unconfirmed analysis also indicates that at least four Hydro boats are deployed in the district, in order to facilitate rapid movement of combat regiments, light armor, and heavy armor units.
The several different airborne units, as well as the air-mobile units are part of the rapid deployment structure common to Soviet Doctrine of Warfare. The augmentation of several air-defense forces at both the Army Group, Divisional, and brigade levels; indicates a rapid response capability which matches the US capabilities in many degrees.
Artillery, chemical, military police, KGB, and other essential units are indigenous to the Military District's Operational structure.
What is concerning are the number of submarines laying just off Alaska's coastal areas; some of which have been updated with modern technologies and weapons delivery systems. It's would be feasible for these submarine forces to deny access to the Bearing Sea, or even the Pacific approaches that could be utilized by the US Naval Forces.
In all; there exists a colossal Soviet military force within quick striking distance of Alaska's shores. Given that the American military presence in Alaska is minimal; should a cross oceanic invasion occur, the Soviets would likely seize large swaths of strategic areas within Alaska, while denying the Alaska military forces movement capability.
I believe that American military force's only option would be to conduct delaying tactics while reinforcements from the lower-48 states could arrive. Much like the obstacles that US/ROK forces faced during the Korean war; would in all likelihood be repeated here in Alaska.
Soviet warfare doctrine has not change much since World War Two. Their advancement in weapons capabilities, as well as war-fighting and signals technology mirrors the achievement of the US. But, their special designation units, as well as advance teams would likely infiltrate into Alaska before the planned invasion. This is evidenced in the Soviets previous cross-border invasions since the 1915 era wars. Afghanistan, Chechnya, Georgia, and other break-away republics were dealt with in the same manner.
Historically the Airborne units, special forces, as well as air-mobile units would be the first echelon formation. Their movement would without doubt, be preceded by a massive air campaign against US Air force assets, as well as a rapid employment of anti-air units to counter any potential attacks by American air assets, and submarine based missile strikes against American artillery units.
Soviet Advance teams could feasible shut down major maritime ports, airfields, and highways leading away from the proposed naval landing areas. Follow-Up forces would include mechanized infantry, light and heavy tanks, as well as mobile rocket launchers and field artillery.
A gradual widening of the area, and pacification of the surrounding civilian areas would then be next on the roster. Pacification is normally carried out through intimidation by a strong show of force, or the outright executions of community leaders, resistance units, and captured military personnel.
Soviet doctrine dictates a rapid envelopment of key objectives, and control of roads, bridges, and government facilities within a 24-hour period. Follow-up forces then bring combined arms units (mechanized Infantry with heavy tank support) against strategic areas. Air defense and field artillery units are an integral parts of this doctrine.
These assumptions and conclusions are based upon an invasion forces seizing a single objective along Alaska's coastline. It's quite possible, and very likely, that several different ports and airfields across Alaska would be seized at the same time. If this is truly the case, then I submit that an asymmetrical war would greatly intensify the conflict beyonf what the Alaska based military is capable of dealing with.
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